Masih Kepikiran Soal UTS SKP

Assalamu alaikum Wr Wb
Hari ini tanggal 15 Nopember 2009, tak terasa kuliah semester 9 DIV Akuntansi STAN tinggal seminggu lagi. Tanggal 23 Nopember Insya Allah kami akan melaksanakan Ujian Akhir Semester 9 (mohon doanya ya, semoga lancar). Masalah persiapan menghadapi ujian tersebut tidak perlu dipertanyakan lagi, karena kami pasti belum siap, he he he.

Bicara masalah ujian, saya masih kepikiran salah satu soal ujian UTS mata kuliah Seminar Keuangan Publik yaitu soal tentang LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM. Catatan yang saya pelajari memang sudah ada, dan saya cuma membaca tulisan tersebut tanpa memperdalam maksudnya. Sebagai akibatnya, saya tidak bisa mengerjakan soal tentang LINDAHL EQULIBRIUM tersebut (padahal soal lain juga ga bisa mengerjakan).
Berikut ini akan saya bayar hutang saya untuk menjawab soal tersebut, meskipun cuma copas dari wikipedia. Silahkan pembaca pahami apa sih yang dimaksud dengan LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM di bawah ini :
(english skill is needed)

Equilibrium under a Lindahl tax describes the situation in which individuals pay for the provision of a public good according to their marginal benefits. Lindahl taxes are sometimes known as benefit taxes.
Erik Lindahl, a student of Knut Wicksell, proposed this method for financing public goods in order to demonstrate the consensus politics was actually possible. Because people are all a bit different in their preferences and circumstances, consensus requires each person to pay a somewhat different tax price for every service. If each person's tax price is set equal to the marginal benefits received at the ideal service level, it turns out that each person will agree to have that service level provided.
The Lindahl equilibrium is Pareto efficient and it can be shown that an equilibrium exists for diverse environments. Unfortunately, Lindahl taxation requires knowledge of the demand functions for each individual for all private and public goods.
When information about marginal benefits is available only from the individuals themselves, this gives rise to a "preference revelation problem." Each person can lower his or her tax cost by under reporting their benefits from the public service. This informational problem implies that survey-based Lindahl taxation is not incentive compatible. Incentives to understate one's true benefits under Lindahl taxation resemble those of a Prisoner's dilemma, and people will be inclined to misrepresent their demand for the public service.
In principle, preference revelation mechanisms can be used to address that problem, although none of these have been shown to completely solve the problem. Amongst others the Clarke-Groves mechanism is an example of this ensuring true values are revealed and that a public good is provided only when it should be. The allocation of cost is taken as given and the consumers will report their net benefits (benefits-cost). The public good will be provided if the sum of the net benefits of all consumers is positive. If the public good is provided side payments will be made reflecting the fact that truth telling is costly. The side payments internalize the net benefit of the public good to other players. The side payments must be financed from outside the mechanism. In reality these preference revelation mechanisms are difficult to implement as the size of the population makes it costly both in terms of money and time.

Source : wikipedia